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Abstract 
Democratic systems are unthinkable without political parties. Since its transition to multi-party 
politics in 1950, Turkey has enjoyed a stable yet limited level of stability in its multi-party 
system. Despite all the democratic experience in electoral politics for more than half a century, 
democracy exists only between, not within political parties in Turkey. The political culture of 
Turkey still tolerates one man-driven, charismatic leader parties administered with excessively 
centralized and authoritarian leadership structures. Turkey’s parties are still controlled mostly by 
men. What they differ is not the presence or absence of intra-party democracy, but their type of 
intra-party autocracy. This study explains the roots of party autocracy culture in Turkey’s parties. 
In doing so, it also develops a theoretical framework for comprehending and explaining intra-
party democracy in democratic systems in general and in Turkey. It also specifies sociological, 
institutional and competitive criteria of intra-party democracy such as political culture, legal 
framework, preferences of individual actors as well as many others including gender quota, 
tolerance for dissent and the degree of power centralization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Political parties are the sine qua non of democratic systems. A political system without a 
competitive party system cannot be referred to as a genuine democracy. One of the major 
institutional actors that paved the way to contemporary democratic systems is political parties. 
For this reason, democracies are unthinkable without political parties.i Indeed, if the word 
‘democracy’ denotes systems in which people rule itself and where the people elect their own 
decision-makers with their free will, the bridging role political parties play between the 
electorates (citizens) and the elected (political elites) is to be acknowledged. 
One-party regimes are not considered democratic as the political monopoly of a single actor is 
far from presenting political and ideological options to the electorates at large. Therefore, what 
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makes contemporary democracies truly democratic is a competitive party system with multiple 
parties in the electoral/political market. Of course, the concept of ‘democracy’ should never be 
regarded as perfection, and the conditions of democracy are far more than just the existence of 
competitive party systems. 
Scholars have debated the ways in which political parties have contributed to democracy and 
democratization of political systems. One of the long-standing competitive party models has 
come from Anthony Downs (1957), who applied the rational actor and rationality of decision-
making assumptions of the neo-classical economics into the political market. Downs put forth 
that political parties are egoistic, selfish institutions with the sole purpose of maximizing their 
votes in elections. Voters are smart and sophisticated agencies, who are well aware of themselves 
and their ideological standings. Ideology is not an end for parties, but only an instrument for the 
ultimate purpose of vote maximization. In the Donwsian (also known as spatial or competitive) 
context of electoral democracy, political parties contribute to democracy by providing sets of 
public policy options to the public and electorates at large.ii Parties collectively comprise the 
political market, ranging from the right-most nationalist, conservative, authoritarian and free-
market stances to the left-most internationalist, liberal, libertarian and socialist positions. As a 
result of the instrumentality of ideology, political parties construct, shape and modify their 
political discourses with regard to the ideological, left-right composition of the electorate, 
particularly the median voter. The winning position for parties for maximizing votes is always as 
closest to the median voter as possible. As the median voter moves closer to the political center, 
parties move to the center too. Similarly, as the median voter moves to the right or the left, so do 
the parties accordingly. A similar argument says parties contribute to democracy by encouraging 
electorates into making preferences among leadership groups, instead of political parties as 
institutions, in regular elections.iii 
Purposes of polical parties cannot, however, be limited to vote maximization, office participaton 
or policy advocacy only. Some of the recently emerging party families are observed to prioritize 
a new set of purposes quite novel and different from typical party goals, such as promotion of 
intra-party democracy.iv These are mostly parties of the new left, which promote themselves as 
distinct from and independent of social democrats, socialists, communists, labour and other 
traditional parties of the left. New left parties are generally known as left-libertarian, green, 
‘libertarian socialist’ parties that combine ecologism (green economy and politics) with a left-
wing economic agenda of social justice and resource redistribution, as well as identity politics 
and multiculturalism on social policy. Therefore, it would be naïve and reductionist to 
comprehend such parties as single-issue movements that talk about the environment only. These 
parties are rather organizations that bring together a variety of traditional and new progressive 
themes including egalitarianism, anti-globalism, feminism, gender equality/liberation, freedom 
of expression, minority rights, welfare state, labor rights as well as standing against traditional 
morality and all types of nationalisms. Nevertheless, the fact that some party families as 
ecological greens embrace ‘intra-party democracy’ in principle or in practice does not suffice to 
justify this concept universally for all democratic regimes. In other words, scholars of politics are 
to develop more convincing and justifying theoretical arguments in favor of intra-party 
democracy as a condition for democratization of democracies. 
Some fringe parties still do their best to survive in politics even if they cannot participate in 
government or win parliamentary seats in their electoral lives. Some scholars argue that the 
major purpose of political parties is more policy advocacy more than vote- or seat-maximization. 
This approach emphasizes ideological purity and policy idealism from the perspective of 
political parties. Indeed, political parties have their institutional history and identity because 
today’s parties have their roots of existence with particular causes of their own. Parties with 
strong political identities are devoted to focusing on the requirements of their identities (i.e., 
socialism, ecologism, liberalism, conservatism), and it is their past that restricts their present. In 
other words, parties cannot change altogether all of a sudden as they are bound by their history.v 
It is not surprising to see some parties that never mention ‘democracy’ in their platforms. Some 
parties with particular ideologies almost never cite democracy as a purpose or an instrument in 
their political agenda. For instance, parties that are known to be contemporary ‘radical right-
wing’ or ‘right-wing authoritarian’ are hardly inclined towards intra-party democracy as they are 
often led by charismatic leaders with unquestionable powers, where decision-making 
mechanisms are centralized. For instance, France’s radical right-wing Jean Marie Le Pen’s 
National Front (Front National) is far enough from intra-party democracy basically as an 
outcome its very ideology: authoritarian, exclusionist and monoculturalist. Similarly, other 
radical right-wing parties of Europe are internally oligarchic, authoritarian and anti-democratic 
where dissenting opinions and criticism of leadership is hardly appreciated. Examples of radical 
right-wing parties include Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs), Belgium’s 
Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang), Germany’s National Democratic Party 
(Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands), Norway’s Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet), 
Britain’s British National Party, Hungary’s Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik 
Magyarországért Mozgalom), and many others. 
Contrary to such parties, intra-party democracy is an indispensable asset for libertarian parties of 
the new left. For this reason, the logical opposite parties of the radical right generally tend to 
emphasize tolerance, recognition of difference, multiculturalism, and therefore developing the 
democracy culture at every domain of social-political life in principle. Even though such parties 
have themes in common, they are not identical on all aspects across democratic countries. All in 
all, it is fair to argue that the concept of intra-party democracy is a push from the left, or 
‘contagion from the left.’ New left-libertarian parties of European democracies serve as 
examples of intra-party democracy to several other party families including liberals, Christian 
Democrats and traditional social democrats/socialists. The recent scholarly work on intra-party 
democracy in Europe generally has generally used survey research with party members and 
remained mostly country-specific.vi 
DEFENDING INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY 
The existence of a competitive party system per se does not guarantee a healthy functioning of, 
or institutional setup of a democratic regime. In addition to a variety of conditions as a healthy 
civil society, freedom of assembly and expression, separation of powers, checks and balances, 
and civil rights and individual freedoms, democracy also requires free and fair competition 
among political parties (inter-party democracy). However, does democracy also require 
democracy within political parties (intra-party democracy)? Scholarly debates have gone both 
ways: in defense of, and in opposition to intra-party democracy. For instance, one of the most 
pessimistic views of party democracy has come from Michels (1962), who posited that the idea 
that democratic institutions can be ruled democratically is only a myth. Michels’s pessimism 
comes from his theoretical debate summarized as the ‘iron law of oligarchy’, according to which 
oligarchic rule by a small group of political elites is the inevitable ‘destiny’ (ending story) of all 
representative institutions including political parties. Therefore, what is called ‘representative 
democracy’ is only a façade to legitimize elite rule rather than rule by people.vii  
Is intra-party democracy a requirement of a democratic culture? In the context, Duverger’s 
(1954) historical argument on the trade-off between intra-party democracy and electoral 
efficiency should be emphasized, as it also relates to the party culture in Turkey. According to 
Duverger, the more political parties achieve intra-party democracy, the more likely they would 
be risking their electoral chances in elections. Decision-making within parties would require a 
more egalitarian and collective decision-making, which would work against top-down, Jacobin 
party rule by a single leader or oligarchy. Advanced intra-party democracy in a party is expected 
to slow down decision-making and cause gridlock, as collective and egalitarian decisions cannot 
be executed as efficiently as monarchic or oligarchic decisions. In cases that require fast 
decision-making, internally democratic parties would have harder time defining strategy and 
behavior. On the contrary, parties with autocratic rule are more likely to make efficient and rapid 
decisions when conditions require fast action. Thus, intra-party democratization might slow 
down the electoral efficiency of a political party during elections.viii Duverger’s argument has 
later been supported by other scholars of party politics on the grounds that only centralization of 
power within parties can provide strength in the electoral competition with other parties, and 
decentralization risks the possibility of internal schisms and fragmentation.ix  
This study relies on the assumption that intra-party democracy is not only a must but also an 
inevitable condition for all parties of democratic systems. From an evolutionary perspective to 
party democracy, it is fair to speculate that political parties of the future’s prospective 
democracies will have to get more internally-democratic inevitably, as citizens will become more 
educated; therefore more informed, more sophisticated and more intelligent. The counter 
arguments to intra-party democracy have generally come up with insufficient arguments in favor 
of party monarchy, oligarchy and hierarchy. Opponents of intra-party democracy have mostly 
given two major reasons for opposing. One, they argue intra-party democracy undermines party 
organizational efficiency causing inertia and divisions within. Secondly, they put forth the idea 
that there is a trade-off between responding to party members’ demands and responsing to 
citizens’ interests.x This second argument relies on the assumption that party members, 
especially activists, are far more radical in their ideology and political demands than ordinary 
citizens and non-members are. Therefore, there is no way to satisfy all of them and siding with 
party members means sacrificing citizens’ interests. 
The argument on the relative radicalism of party activists relies on May’s (1973) ‘law of 
curvilinear disparity’, according to which both party top elites and ordinary voters, supporters 
and sympathizers (party non-elites) are moderate, centrist in their ideological predispositions. 
Party activists are conceptualized as ‘middle elites’, different from both top elites and non-elites. 
Party leaders are expected to take more pragmatic decisions and thus more moderate, centrist 
stances on public policy issues as a result of their desire to maintain their power and ranks in 
their party offices, which curbs their policy idealism. Ordinary supporters are expected to be 
similarly centrist and pragmatist as a result of their loose connections with their parties as simply 
voters rather than party ideologues. Nevertheless, party activists (middle elites) are expected to 
be far more idealistic in their politics and more radical and extremist in their political demands as 
they are neither loose party-voters nor practical party elites.xi 
In addition to practical benefits of intra-party democracy, this study takes intra-party democracy 
as an ideal, which cannot be attained perfectly but should still be targeted by democratic actors. 
In fact, even before the concept of party democracy, the term ‘democracy’ should be elaborated 
on. Several people mistakenly take the concept of democracy as an end in itself, as if there is a 
perfectly democratic system as such. During the whole Cold War period, several people 
including scholars and academics believed in a dualistic categorization of regimes classified into 
black-and-white, discrete categories of ‘democratic’ versus ‘totalitarian’ systems. Currently, we 
are more aware of the magnitude of continuum between several types of autocratic and 
democratic systems. 
Today, we are more aware of the fact that the so-called democracy can never be treated as an end 
or perfection. On the contrary, democracy is always a process and even the most democratic 
system can get more democratized; and intra-party democratization can be only one component 
of that process. As Giddens put it, current crises of democracies can be overcome through 
‘democratization of democracy’ with direct local processes, public and electronic referenda as 
well as all micro and macro forces of society.xii Democratic regimes can further democratize 
with the help of democratic institutions being administered democratically from within. 
Institutions that are administered internally-democratically serve as examples to society as they 
contribute to the strengthening of a democratic socio-political culture in society. On the contrary, 
institutions administered autocratically would remain far from doing so.  
In his defense of intra-party democracy, Teorell (1999) reviews three alternative constructive 
frameworks of party democracy: Competitive, Participatory and Deliberative. The competitive 
approach lays emphasis on the parties’ function of interest/preference aggregation in society. 
Translation of individual preferences into collective public policy is mostly the task of political 
parties in the executive office. From this perspective, a perfect match between members, activists 
and ordinary supporters of political parties is utopia; therefore political parties have to make a 
choice between the political and policy demands of their activists in the party or supporters on 
the street. As a result, intra-party democracy is not a necessity but a burden. The participatory 
framework emphasizes the need for a representative institutional setup at the national level, with 
the equal right to self-development as a must for any democracy. The concept of participation is 
conceived as a pyramidal system in which direct democracy constitutes the base and above that, 
only delegatory democracy.xiii 
Teorell criticizes both frameworks and lays out the strengths of the deliberative defense of intra-
party democracy. He mentions that the real virtue of democracy is not providing equal right to 
participation in politics but equal right to make up minds. However, construction of independent 
minds is not possibly in private sphere only. Deliberation requires communications and sharing 
in public space. Therefore, intra-party democracy should be conceptualized as an instrument for 
connecting the legislative institutions sensitive to electoral/public opinion in general elections. It 
is true that pressure groups of civil society perform similar functions, but pressure groups can 
represent or articulate quite restricted, specific or singular interests. In contrast, political parties 
are superior arenas for democratic deliberation because they consider collective interests and 
whole ranges of a variety of issues simultaneously.xiv 
The extent of intra-party democracy relies on a number of factors, including (i) the extent to 
which parties are charismatic, leader-driven parties, (ii) the extent to which parties are 
administered ‘from the top’, that is: the degree of power centralization, (iii) the distribution of 
power and authority in the party, (iv) demographic distribution of party members with regards to 
social class, gender, education, age, etc., (v) the power of local party branches and caucuses, (vi) 
the supervision of party bureaucracy, (vii) the extensiveness of party membership and many 
more others.xv Charismatic leader-driven and excessively centralized parties are hardly 
democratic within. The role of party chairs and the ways in which they are elected are crucial in 
the analysis of power centralization within a party. The distribution of power within a party has a 
lot to do with the legal and procedural authorizations of party leader and leadership cadres. 
Especially in Turkey, party chairs are excessively empowered at the expense almost all local 
party branches and organizations. It is true that leaders come even before parties in Turkey. This 
fact is explainable with social reality of Turkey’s political culture. Turkey has been close to a 
one-man culture in its politics, a political culture of strong charismatic leaders for quite a long 
time, since the late Ottoman and the early Republican years. For this reason, today’s political 
parties are generally secondary behind their strong leaders, and they remain giant yet inert 
organizations under the shadows of their leaders.xvi  
There are a variety of universalizable criteria of intra-party democracy within the context of 
contemporary European and Anglo-American democracracies. Some of these criteria are about 
the distribution of authority and resources within the party, while some are related to the 
sociology and demographics of party membership. In principle, parties where decision-making 
mechanisms work with bottom-up are more internally democratic than those with Jacobin, top-
down decision-making. After all, bottom-up processes are indicators of effective local party 
organizations. Therefore, one major dimension of intra-party democracy is the extent of 
centralization/decentralization of power within a party. In the Turkish context, all major parties 
are administered from Ankara, the center. The more a political party embraces a degree of 
decentralization of power, the more likely the central administration would be delegating some 
of its power and authority to the party’s local branches and organizations. In other words, 
decentralization means parties’ provincial, district and sub-district branches having some 
leverage over the party center. In this context, decentralization of power is definitely one major, 
but not the only criterion of intra-party democracy Turkey’s parties. 
Another criterion of intra-party democracy has to do with the extent to which a party embraces 
social masses and connects with people. Parties that are dominated or controlled by only a cohort 
(sub-section) of society (i.e., whites, men, the wealthy, Turks) are hardly democratic in the first 
place. Considering the fact that parties that embrace democracy would be willing to appeal to a 
huge variety of social segments in elections, those with extensive demographic membership can 
be said to be more democratic than parties with restricted membership. In a similar vein, parties 
that represent a variety of social classes or cohorts are naturally more democratic than those that 
open their doors to only a restricted social class or cohort. For instance, especially in the context 
of a highly conservative and male-dominant, patriarchal society like Turkey, gender matters. A 
party with a membership closer to a 50%-50% gender distribution would be more democratic 
than a predominantly male party. In practice, however, there is no party with an equal gender 
distribution in Turkey.  
Another criterion of intra-party democracy is about participation, that is, participatory 
democracy. Contemporary democracies are systems where ordinary citizens have a say on the 
system itself. Political participation becomes possible only when people can express their 
dissenting opinions freely. For instance, it is quite difficult to talk about intra-party democracy in 
hierarchical party platforms where leaders cannot be criticized and the rank-and-file members are 
expected to show full obedience to party elites. In a democratic party, differentiation and even 
confrontation of ideas should be considered natural and ‘normal’. The bottomline in this context 
is the borderlines of freedom of expression in a political party. Party democracy is possible when 
dissent and criticism are possible and when party members can agree to disagree. Democratic 
parties are expected to have mechanisms for compromise, consensus, crisis management as well 
as conflict resolution. In contrast, parties where dissent is unwelcome and monolithic hierarchy 
is the norm are autocracies only. 
Duverger’s argument is quite applicable to the case of political parties in Turkey. In general, lack 
of intra-party democracy is a common problem of all political parties in Turkey. Ergo, the lower 
branches and local organizations of political parties do not meddle with the affairs of the top 
party administrations, as this is not a widely embraced practice in Turkey’s party politics and 
culture.
xviii
xvii As of today, neither the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi, AKP) nor the oppositionary Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) 
has intra-party democracy. In contrast, both parties are heavily driven by their charismatic 
leaders, Tayyip Erdoğan and Devlet Bahçeli respectively. With a similar logic, it is quite difficult 
to talk about democracy within the center-left Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi, CHP). Especially during the leadership years of Deniz Baykal (CHP’s former chair 
before Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the current CHP chair), any criticism of Baykal or dissent from his 
rule was harshly suppressed in the party. Challenging Baykal’s chair seat in regular or 
extraordinary party caucuses turned to be almost impossible due to series of changes in the party 
charter made by the Baykal leadership cadres.   
In a similar vein, Bülent Ecevit’s ‘democratic left’ Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, 
DSP) suffered a lot from charistmatic leadership to the extent of party monarchy by the Ecevit 
couple. The DSP’s organs and local branches exercised almost no influence on the party’s 
directions and strategies. The sole power of the DSP rested on its very leader and his wife, 
Bülent and Rahşan Ecevits.xix Sema Pişkinsüt, the only woman who dared to challenge Ecevit’s 
chair in the DSP was seriously assaulted in the party congress for her courage to do so. Another 
example is the MHP, which experienced schism and violence after the death of its historical 
leader Alparslan Türkeş. After his son Tuğrul Türkeş was not elected chair by the party 
delegates, the MHP party caucus witnessed a harsh confrontation between Türkeş supporters and 
Bahçeli supporters, and the party youth-wing leader Azmi Karamahmutoğlu said “long live 
illegality for the traitors” (“yaşasın hainler için illegalite”). The Kurdish left, represented by a 
series of parties and lately Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP) seems 
to be the most internally democratic only when compared to the other three parliamentary actors. 
All in all, it is obvious that all parliamentary parties of Turkey have a lot to go in their way to 
democratization. When members of major parties are asked directly, they generally tend to say 
say “yes, we have party democracy in our party”,xx but what party members say is hardly an 
evidence of the reality within political parties in Turkey. 
THE ROOTS OF INTRA-PARTY AUTOCRACY IN TURKEY’S POLITICAL PARTY 
CULTURE 
Considering the rapid speed of change the party system in Turkey has shown over the years, it is 
fair to argue that the Turkish party system is quite dynamic. The early Republican years, from 
1923 to the late 1940s, are characterized as the one-party period led by the Republican People’s 
Party (CHP), the party that founded modern Turkey. Two attempts to form a second opposition 
party failed with the formation and the subsequent closures of Progressive Republican Party 
(Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, TCF) and Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet 
Fırkası, SCF) during this early Republican period. The transition would come with the 
foundation of Demokrat Parti (DP) by the teams of Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar in 1946 
and the 1950 elections, which broke the domination of the CHP radically for the first time in 
history with the DP’s overwhelming electoral victory, which Kalaycıoğlu refers to as a ‘White 
Revolution’.xxi The electoral politics of the 1950s transformed Turkey from a one-party to a two-
party system with the CHP on the center left and the DP on the center right. However, the young 
officers’ coup against the DP government in 1960 and the subsequent making of the 1961 
Constitution changed the party system in Turkey forever, once more. 
The purpose of the 1960 coup was not only to overthrow the DP’s parliamentary tyranny of 
majority but also to provide a new institutional setup for a real system of checks and balances 
among the three branches of government. For this purpose, a series of higher legal and judicial 
institutions were created such as the Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi), a bicameral 
legislature with the upper chamber Republican Senate (Cumhuriyet Senatosu), State Planning 
Institution (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı) and the like. More importantly for the party system, 
however, the subsequent 1961 Constitution aimed to expand the limits of political freedoms and 
freedom of expression and assembly in Turkey. Even though it did not allow formation of radical 
parties on the right and the left, it was because of the libertarian content of the constitution that a 
new series of unorthodox parties were formed in Turkey for the first time to the left of CHP and 
to the right of the DP. After the 1961 Constitution, Turkey’s party system changed from a two-
party to a multi-party type once and forever. For the first time during the 1960s, the electorate of 
Turkey got acquainted with a variety of new ideas and ideologies ranging from National 
Socialism, racism and Turkish ultra-nationalism on the radical right to all varieties of socialism, 
Marxism and anarchism on the very left, together with new types of conservatism and Islamic 
revivalism. With this acquaintance and transition, Turkey’s party system truly got inter-party 
democracy. However, what has been going on among parties hitherto has been quite different 
from what has been going on within them so far. 
Among societies of the Middle East, especially after the most recent waves of the so-called Arab 
Spring with people’s collective protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, the importance of 
competitive party systems and democracy is to be appreciated once again in a ‘torn’ country like 
Turkey, stuck somewhere between ‘the West’ and ‘the East’, a part of neither Europe and the 
Middle East or both. Competitive party system is a process that is ‘learned’ by societies with 
trials and errors in their electoral and political history. By ‘learning’, what is meant is not an 
individual exposure to some teaching but a process of collective adjustment by society, 
absorbing past experiences and not repeating the errors. Thanks to the White Revolution of the 
1950 as well as the post-1960 transitions in Turkey, the society got acquainted the idea of the 
‘political market’ and the practice of a free electoral market well enough. Even though the 
military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980, as well as the post-modern military aggressions of 
the 1990s caused disturbance in the political market, the competitive party system remained a 
strong norm in the society’s political culture. As a result of Turkey’s electoral multi-party 
experience, there is no real problem of inter-party democracy in Turkey today. The major 
problem is intra-party democracy within parties rather than inter-party democracy among parties. 
When we look at the major political parties of Turkey, we observe not identical but similar kinds 
of authoritarianisms with similar types of charismatic leaders, similar rhetorics, similar cheering 
crowds of supporters, and similar ‘leader-worshipping’s. There are exceptional parties on the 
fringe parties of radical or libertarian left, but first fringe parties are exceptions, and second, even 
progressive actors are influenced by the authoritarian party culture in Turkey. Even though 
parties show particular differences between them and uniqueness of their own lack of 
democracy, we can talk about some general factors that collectively comprise the causes of intra-
party autocracy in the political parties of Turkey. These general factors can be categorized as (1) 
Sociological, (2) Institutional and (3) Competitive. Sociological factors are directly related to the 
wrongs and rights of the society and culture; institutional factors are about the cause and history 
of political parties as political actors; and finally, competitive factors are mostly about 
individuals, that is, people who run parties, those who work in/for parties, and those who vote for 
parties. 
Sociological factors have to do the political culture of Turkey’s society. Intra-party autocracy has 
been largely constructed by the authoritarian political culture in Turkey. The state-founding CHP 
was controlled by Kemalist elites aggressive towards both ‘foreign enemies’ and the internal 
enemies of the new, secular regime. The CHP’s single-party years during the early Republican 
period was characterized by an unresponsive, non-competitive, Jacobin and centralized one-party 
regime, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and then İsmet İnönü, the two most powerful ‘founding 
fathers’. The institutional structure the DP inherited from the CHP back in the 1950s was still 
authoritarian. In fact, the DP’s White Revolution erased the one-man regime of CHP with İsmet 
İnönü and brought a new one-man regime of DP this time with Adnan Menderes as the DP’s 
prime minister. With this transition, the DP also initiated a clientelistic interest representation 
system of its own, by which the DP’s political elites established patron-client relations with the 
local elites (i.e., landlords, local bourgeoisie). In this type of central-local leaders’ relationships, 
central leaders have perceived locals as ‘clients’ more than civic citizens and engaged in short-
term vote-maximizing deals instead of long-term policy advocacy. The DP’s clientelistic 
tradition was later embraced by other conservative and nationalist parties of the right in later 
decades, such as the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) and the Welfare Party (Refah 
Partisi, RP).xxii 
Another factor that maintains this autocratic party culture in Turkey is the institutional context, 
also related to the legacy of the military interventions in recent history. The political context in 
the late 1970s was extremely polarized both on the elite and street levels, with non-cooperating 
party leaders in national politics and reports of assassinations and street gang violence on news 
sources almost every day. As a result, the military forces of Turkey carried though the most 
destructive military coup to civilian democracy in modern Turkey’s entire history in 1980. The 
military interim junta government (1980-83) also dissolved the national legislature, banned all 
the existing parties, barred all party elites from politics altogether and draftied a new 1982 
Constitution that restricted many of the previously existing political liberties and labor rights. It 
was this 1980 military takeover and the subsequent 1982 Constitution that paved the way for 
increasing authoritarianism on almost every domain of social life and political culture in the 
following years, including new legislations that restricted the existing freedoms. 
The legal-institutional framework that has been justifying and maintaining party autocracy in 
Turkey has been the Law on Political Parties (Siyasi Partiler Kanunu), which was initially 
devised after the 1982 Constitution. This law has justified a hierarchical model for all parties as 
it has lead to the cartelization of parties that are dependent on state revenues, made it possible for 
candidate selection by directly party leadership and chairs in Ankara (instead of local branches), 
and homogenized the internal structure and functions of all legal parties on paper.xxiii As of 
today, the intra-party autocracy in Turkey’s political culture continues to be directly nourished 
by the legal-institutional framework of the same law. No elected leader or powerful party comes 
close to changing it as it works for the interests of the already powerful parties with already 
powerful leadership structures. Democratizing the system may not work the best for the interests 
of the existing power structures in the existing parties in Turkey. 
A third, yet very important factor behind authoritarian party culture has to do with the individual 
actors, the political leaders themselves as well as their surrounding circles. Leader-worshipping 
and leader-idolization are inherent components of Turkey’s political culture also stemming from 
not only the early Republican years led by Mustafa Kemal but also the late Ottoman years of late 
padishahs. Well before party supporters and activists, all party leaders have tendency to 
consolidate their personal leadership power within their party organizations.xxiv Individual power 
relations matter largely in this context. Parties with relatively vertical (hierarchical) relations are 
generally autocratic, while those with horizontal (egalitarian) relations are expected to be more 
democratic. Leadership charisma is an individual-level factor that shapes all party members’ 
incentives and behavior in Turkey politico-cultural environment. Leadership cadres tend to 
distribute positive and negative incentives (rewards and punishments) in order to achieve their 
political and power-related purposes. These incentives include material, solidary and purpose 
incentives. Material incentives are individual-based, tangible and exclusive such as money, jobs 
and government contracts. Solidary incentives are collective-based and intangible such as 
satisfaction of social belonging and having a party identity as a civic duty. Purposive incentives 
are more ideology and issue-based. For instance, some people join socialist parties for the sake 
of enhancing labor rights, social welfare and income redistribution in the country. Or some join 
Christian Democrats for expanding religious freedoms in the country.xxv In Turkey, leaders and 
leadership oligarchies are so powerful that they often monopolize all the power to distribute all 
material benefits, which are quite effective in shaping the qualite and intensity of solidary and 
purposive incentives as well. 
DISCUSSION 
Political parties are the inherent components of all democratic regimes. Inter-party competition 
has mostly been strengthened as a result of democratic electoral politics in democratic regimes 
over time. Nevertheless, what happens within parties is still an ongoing debate. The causes and 
consequences of intra-party democracy is still a debated issue. Some scholars argue against intra-
party democracy on the grounds that democratization from within a party declines its chances of 
electoral success. This study rests of the normative argument that intra-party democracy is the 
next step of democratic regimes after the consolidation of inter-party democracy in competitive 
elections.  
Turkey is a democratizing country. Several scholarly works and databases take Turkey as a semi-
democracy rather than a full democracy or a full autocracy. With the recent debates about police 
brutality and the authoritarian political culture of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the 
debates on Turkey’s democratization have intensified. For this reason, what happens within 
Turkey’s parties is as important as what happens between them in Turkey’s elections. 
Democratization is a process, and all democratic regimes have a lot more to further democratize. 
In this context, Turkey’s political parties are no exceptions. Among the four parliamentary actors 
of the national legislature, both right-wingers AKP and MHP lack intra-party democracy also 
because of their long-standing leader-worshipping cultures. The center-left CHP is not all that 
different from the two right-wingers. The party that stands relatively closer to an intra-party 
democracy ideal is the Kurdish left represented by the BDP. 
The BDP has had qualities that put the party two steps ahead of the other three including co-
presidency, distinctively high participation of women as well as an egalitarian membership 
structure. Nevertheless, the BDP is the most internally democratic only when compared to the 
other three major parties. All in all, Turkey’s political parties have a lot to go in terms of 
democratization, which will probably take more than one or two generations in the future. The 
contribution of political science to intra-party democracy in Turkey could be realized by 
benefiting from the historical experiences of more internally democratic parties elsewhere or 
countries with more Democratic Party systems. 
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